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Togo – 2017 
 
Dirk Kohnert 
 
 
The demand for political alternance, initiated by institutional and electoral reforms, 
constituted the major contentious issue between the government and the challengers of 
the Gnassingbé regime throughout the year. Civil society organizations and 
representatives of the Christian church supported the demands of the opposition. The 
protest of the notorious divided opposition took a new momentum since August with the 
lead by a hitherto hardly known opposition party and its charismatic leader, Tikpi 
Atchadam. He organized huge demonstrations of all the 14 opposition parties in the 
second half of the year which put the government progressively under pressure. Foreign 
affairs were dominated by the impact of increased aid by the international donor 
community. Socio-economic development was marked by diminishing human 
development and economic freedom. 
 
 
Domestic Politics  
 
The controversy about institutional and electoral reforms in order to initiate political 
change after nearly 50 years of rule of the Gnassingbé Regime continued to dominate 
domestic politics. Right at the start of the year President Faure Gnassingbé nominated 
two advisory bodies. On 3rd January, he installed a national commission of reflection 
on the institutional and electoral reforms that had been proposed already five years 
before by the National Truth and Reconciliation Commission (CVJR, 2012). The 
reforms had been demanded by the opposition and the international donor community 
time and again since several years. The president of the commission of reflection, Mme. 
Awa Nana Daboya, had already been designated two years before (9. January 2015), 
whereas the appointment of the remaining members had been retarded. The eight 
members nominated now included former Prime Minister Kwesi Ahoomey-Zunu, Adji 
Oteth Ayassor, another former Cabinet Minister, the president of the University of 
Lomé, Prof. Dodzi Kokoroko and other personalities of public life. All of them were 
more or less associated with the Gnassingbé Regime, none of them was close to the 
opposition. The opposition regarded this step as another attempt of Mr. Gnassingbé to 
put into question the compromise on institutional reforms that had been reached already 
in 2006, mediated by the international donor community,  within the framework of the 
Global Political Accord (APG). Therefore, it was no surprise that the president of the 
opposition coalition CAP 2015 (Combat pour l’Alternance Politique en 2015), Brigitte 
Adjamagbo-Johnson, objected to this commission of reflection. To mollify the 
opposition and as confidence-building measure, the government promised one week 
later first payments of compensation (about 3.6 m. Euro) for atrocities of political 
violence committed during the upheavals between 1958 and 2005 as proposed by the 
CVJR. The promise was honored at the end of the year (12. December) with reparations 
for 137 out of a total of 2,475 victims identified by the High Commission of 
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Reconciliation (Haut-Commisariat à la Reconciliation et au Renforcement de l’Unité, 
HCRRUN). According to this commission the financial compensation would be only 
one avenue of different compensation-options envisaged for the victims, like restitution 
of property, employment generation, granting of personal liberty and other human 
rights. On 6 January, the Head of State nominated the seven members of the High 
Authority to combat corruption. The agency itself had been created by law already two 
years before in July 2015 without being operational. The personalities nominated were 
selected for a three years period of office (one time repeatable). Again, the opposition 
doubted the neutrality and independence of the chosen members as well as their 
capability to control corruption effectively. It suspected, the main reason behind this 
exercise was window dressing, based on the ambition of the government to gain 
additional credit internationally to boost its candidacy as eligible model country with 
respect to the upcoming elections of the Millenium Challenge Account of the UN.  
 
In response to the unyielding attitude of the government and the inconclusive 
negotiations with the divided opposition, forces of the so-called ‘moderate opposition’ 
created (9. January) a new informal opposition coalition composed of six smaller 
opposition parties, of which only two were represented in parliament, i.e. ADDI 
(Alliance of Democrats for Integral Development) and FDR (Democratic Forces for the 
Republic, an elimination of the former opposition party CAR). This informal coalition 
had no name nor leader, its principal aim was to promote political reforms, including 
devolution of power and the creation of local authorities. Apparently, it wanted to 
bridge the political stalemate between the major ‘radical’ opposition coalition CAP 
2015 and the smaller ‘moderate’ opposition coalition Arc-en-ciel (CAEC) on the one 
side and the ruling party UNIR (Union pour la Republique) on the other. However, this 
exercise was unsuccessful too. The admission of another new political party, the African 
Democratic Socialists (DSA, Démocrates Socialistes Africains) led by Targone Sambiri 
into CAP 2015 on 6 February did not result in a new drive for political change either, 
apart from the augmentation of CAP to now five members: i.e. the ANC (Alliance 
Nationale pour le Changement), by far the biggest opposition party headed by J.P. Fabre 
who was the official opposition leader, the CDPA (Convention démocratique des 
peuples africains) led by Brigitte Adjamagbo-Johnson who was also the coordinator of 
CAP, the PSR (Pacte Socialiste pour le Renouveau), the UDS (Union pour la 
démocratie et le progrès social) and DSA. However, six months later, in August, an 
hitherto hardly known opposition party, the Parti National Panafricain (PNP), founded 
in 2014, thoroughly shuffled up the encrusted domestic politics in organizing huge 
demonstrations of all the 14 opposition parties (CAP 2015, group of 6 ‘moderate’ 
opposition parties (arc-en-ciel), CAR, PNP, Santé du people). This was facilitated by a 
new approach to politics of PNP’s charismatic leader, Tikpi Atchadam, a former student 
leader at the University of Lomé and 50 year old lawyer from profession, who 
originated from the Tem (Kotokoli) people of Kparatao, a village 7 km from Sokodé, 
Central Togo. His use of modern technics of diffusion of his message, like WhatsApp as 
well as DVD copies of his strong speeches, distributed up to the most remote villages, 
contributed to his success. He motivated the discontented with his outspoken language 
to come out en masse and to demonstrate for a speedy end of the autocratic reign of the 
Gnassingbé dynasty. Big anti-government marches with over 100,000 participants 
(according to amnesty international) in Lomé on 6 and 7 September aroused special 
attention. This all the more since social network organization had been systematically 
hindered by the government that had blocked access to WhatsApp, mobile phone and 
internet. The call of the ruling Union pour la Republique (UNIR) for a counter-
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demonstration the same day attracted just some thousand persons even though some of 
the supporters admitted vis à vis RFI journalists on the ground that they had been paid 
5,000 F CFA (7,50 €) each for participating. Shortly before, simultaneous anti-
government demonstrations in urban centers of Lomé, Atakpamé, Kara, and Sokodé on 
19 and 20 August had been violently reprimanded by the security forces. The violence 
resulted in at least two death, several injuries and the conviction of 14 out of 27 
demonstrators, accused of rebellion, violence and aggravated theft, among them the 
general secretary of the PNP. Further big anti-government demonstrations were to come 
on 29. and 30. November and 2. December. Apart from that the opposition refused to 
participate in a consultative forum aimed at ending the crisis which was organized by 
the government in mid of December.  
 
Meanwhile, the government had continued the process of national reconciliation 
according to its own agenda. It organized a new delimitation of municipal borders and 
with it of local constituencies. This was apparently deemed necessary as precondition 
for winning the envisaged local elections which had been postponed time and again 
since 1987. At the end of the year local elections were envisaged for June 2018, 
together with the likewise pending general elections. On 23 June the parliamentary 
majority of the ruling party UNIR voted a draft law on the creation of 116 
municipalities. They were divided between the five regions and 39 prefectures of the 
country, including 14 new communes, whereby each prefecture enclosed at least two 
communes. The independent local election commissions (CELI) and their territorial 
jurisdictions had been reduced by decree from 42 to 38. The opposition denounced the 
method of delimitation as a tribalistic exercise which allegedly had the major aim to 
assure the maximum of communes in favor of the Gnassingbé regime. For example, the 
latter had created relatively more municipalities in the sparsely populated North, 
considered to be the traditional fief of the ruling party, compared with the densely 
populated South, held to be the stronghold of the opposition. The oppositional ANC 
recalled its disillusioning experience of the 2007 legislative elections when the 
opposition was defeated although it had gained by far the most votes, i.e. 1,2 m, against 
0,9 m for the ruling party. However, due to the layout of the electoral constituencies 
(commune) in favor of the ruling party already at that time, and the seats in parliament 
being distributed per commune, the ruling party had gained nevertheless a large 
majority in parliament.  
 
From 3 to 9 July the government organized in addition nationwide ‘purification 
ceremonies’. The latter made allusion to customary religious practices in order to 
“exorcise the evil”, i.e. to appease the victims of gross human rights violations 
committed in the period 1958 to 2005. Although the four big religious entities (catholic 
and protestant church, Islam and vodun) acknowledged the importance of such 
symbolic acts, the population in general was little impressed. Therefore, little later the 
church took sides with the opposition. On 18 September the Bishops Conference of 
Togo urged the government to carry out reforms requested by the people in accordance 
with the 1992 Constitution which had been revised by late General Eyadéma in favor of 
the Gnassingbé regime in 2002. The Episcopal Conference also denounced the wave of 
repression as well as “the excessive use of force against fellow citizens, sometimes even 
in their homes”. Last, but not least, it urged the Army to adopt a Republican attitude of 
political neutrality in accordance with the Constitution and advised the regime to refrain 
from inciting ethnic hatred in the media and social networks. In view of growing 
popular pressure the UNIR majority in parliament adopted one day later (19 September) 
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a law proposal for the review of the 1992 Constitution. However, that proposal excluded 
decisive points of contention with the opposition on this point such as the introduction 
of a retroactive presidential term limit in order to end the 50 years-rule of the 
Gnassingbé regime immediately. Yet, the government majority did not get the required 
quorum (four-fifths of the deputies of the National Assembly) because the opposition 
boycotted the vote. Therefore, the head of state had recourse to a constitutional 
referendum on the law to be held on a not yet determined date in 2018.  
 
End of October (28. to 29.) the ruling party UNIR held its initial party congress at 
Tsévié (Maritime Region, 32 km north of the capital), the first congress since its making 
in 2012. The major aim of the convention was the renewal of party organs and 
personnel, including women members and young Turks of the party. Thus, the former 
prefect of Blitta (Central Region), Aklesso Atchole, became executive secretary of the 
party and was therewith admitted to the inner power circle of the regime. Mme 
Mémounatou Ibrahima, nicknamed ‘the combatante’, who had been minister in various 
cabinets of late Eyadéma and his son Faure, became vice-president of the party. Two 
younger party members, Malik Natchaba (councilor of the President, 39 years) and 
Mazamesso Assih (38 years), daughter of the former president of the National 
Assembly, F. Natchaba, were elected leaders of the young members of UNIR (MJU) in 
early December. End of March, the government had already nominated Mme. Ingrid 
Asade, apostrophized Togo’s ‘Iron Lady’, a close follower of Faure Gnassingbé, as new 
head of the national social security fund, the Caisse nationale de sécurité sociale 
(CNSS), thus replacing the powerful Koffi Kadanga Walla. The opposition suspected 
the replacement to be a strategic maneuver in view of the upcoming 2018 elections. 
Allegedly, the CNSS had often been used in the past as covered war chest of the 
Gnassingbé clan to finance election campaigns.   
 
 Human Rights violations continued to be a great concern. In January, eleven 
Ghanaians were shot dead and beheaded in Northern Togo near the Benin-Togo border. 
They were believed to be victims of ‘modern day slavery’ from Northern Ghana who 
were returning home from Nigeria. Ghana was said to be a source, transit, and 
destination country for children and women trafficked for the purposes of forced labor 
and commercial sexual exploitation. Apart from that, member states of the UN Human 
Rights Council (OHCHR, Geneva) as well as amnesty international (ai) in its annual 
report on Togo, published in February, were alarmed about continuing impunity, 
excessive violence of police and gendarmerie, arbitrary arrests, and restriction of 
freedom of expression. On 28 February, for example, the security forces dispersed 
demonstrations in Lomé against the rise in petrol prices with live ammunition, killing 
one person and wounding several others. According to observers the protesters had been 
peaceful until the police charged them with batons, tear gas and live ammunition. On 18 
October, four people were shot dead (one in Lomé and three in Sokodé), several injured 
and about sixty arrested in the course of violently suppressed anti-government 
demonstrations in Lomé and Sokodé. The demonstrations took to the street although the 
government had forbidden demonstrations on weekdays shortly before, because of past 
experience with severe impairment of traffic because of demonstrator’s violence, a 
decision which the opposition regarded as an illegal restriction of its basic rights. The 
demonstrations in Sokodé had been triggered by the imprisonment of an Imam close to 
opposition leader Tikpi Atchadam. The Imam had openly brand marked the violence of 
military personnel against opponents of the regime. Already before, on 20 September, 
one child had been shot and 25 injured during non-authorized demonstrations in Mango 
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in the extreme North of the country. The families of the victims brought charges at the 
International Criminal Court (ICC), the Hague, against the responsible army 
commander, general, Damehane Yark, one of the old stalwarts of the Gnassingbé 
regime, three days later.  
 
In early February (6.2.) the High Authority for Audiovisual and Communication 
(HAAC) shut down a private radio and a TV station, City FM and La Chaine du Futur, 
both of the group Sud-Médias, for allegedly breaching licensing rules. One day later, a 
journalist was severely beaten-up by the gendarmerie and arrested because he was 
documenting an eviction in Lomé. Shortly later, the general prosecutor warned anyone 
reporting this case of the risk of criminal prosecution for disseminating false news. 
Early June the HAAC suspended the newspaper La Nouvelle for one month for breach 
of journalist ethics and warned journalists to “shy away from publishing gruesome 
stories and images”. The HAAC statue did not provide any appeal possibilities for these 
decisions. According to ai, the criminalization of the media created a climate of fear and 
self-censorship and discouraged journalists and the civil society from criticizing HR 
abuses, notably on subjects such as corruption, the army, the President, and the 
President’s family.  
 
Increasing encroaching on internet media freedom, taken various forms, ranging 
from subtly increasing regulatory powers over social media to wholesale internet 
shutdowns to thwart huge anti-government demonstrations in early September gave 
reason to growing concern according to the EIU democracy index 2017 for Togo that 
ranked Togo medias all in all as “unfree”. Government interference with the internet 
and mobile phones was of special concern in view of the growing reliance on digital 
information and communication technologies (ITCs) in the context of participatory 
development approaches of international donor agencies. According to the latest data 
available (2016) 75% of Togolese had a mobile-cellular subscription and 11.3% used 
the internet, a penetration rate well below the African average of 27.7%. In June, the 
French companies Téolis and GVATogo-Vivendi were awarded licenses as internet 
service providers in order to improve the low performance of Togo’s internet, and to 
end the duopoly of the state-owned operator Togo Telecom and the privately owned 
Café Informatique,. A national broadband infrastructure had already been established to 
connect public buildings in Lomé and Kara (Northern Togo) by a 250 km fibreoptic 
network. Affoh Atcha Dedji, member the direction of UNIR and deputy of Tchamba, a 
henchman of Faure Gnassingbé, was nominated DG of Togocom, a new body formed 
by the fusion of Togo Télecom and Togocel at the end of the year. Its president was 
another partisan of the President, Colonel Dokisime Gnama Latta, a Kabyé and former 
minister of security in the cabinet (2012). Thus, the control of electronic communication 
channels remained firmly in the hands of the securocrats of the regime. Nevertheless, 
the World Press Freedom Index 2017 of the global media watchdog ‘Reporters without 
Borders’ ranked Togo 86. out of 180 countries, i.e. an improvement by two points 
compared with past year (88, 2016).  
 
Harsh prison conditions remained a problem, notably overcrowding with over 4,200 
prisoners in the 12 prisons of the country designed to hold 2,720. Congestion of prisons 
was mainly due to abnormal length of pre-trial custody. In May, 63.8% of prisoners 
were still waiting for their judgement, several of them for years, as the National 
Commission for Human Rights (CNDH, Lomé) in collaboration with the ministry of 
Justice revealed on occasion of the African Day for pre-trial custody. Apart from this, 
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there prevailed a general mistrust on the part of the general population vis à vis the 
Togolese justice system. According to a survey (published in May) by the independent 
Togolese NGO Centre de Recherche et de Sondage d’Opinions (CROP, Lomé) in 
conjunction with Afrobarometer, only 37% of a representative sample of interviewed 
admitted to trust the system. Additional 48% evoked problems of corruption and the 
long delay of cases.  
 
All in all, Togo was still classified as ‘partly free’ according to Freedom House’s 
overall ‘Freedom in the World Rating – 2017’, the same as in 2016 (Aggregate Score: 
48/100), with political rights and civil liberties both scoring 4/7 (1=Most Free, 7=Least 
Free). In the global ranking of the quality of democracy 2016, published by the 
independent Democracy Ranking Association (Vienna) in February, Togo still ranked 
next to Nigeria among the countries with the lowest scores worldwide (rank 103 of 112 
countries), although it counted among the 10 best improvers in democracy in 
comparison of the survey period 2014-2015 with 2011-2012. Economist Intelligence 
Unit's EIU-2017 Democracy Index ranked Togo 142 out of 167 countries worldwide, 
down by ten places from last year but considerably higher than the country's ranking in 
the first edition of the Democracy Index, i.e. 164
th
 (rank 1.75) in 2006. With an overall 
score of 3.32, Togo is still classed as an "authoritarian" regime, like 22 of the other 44 
Sub Saharan African countries in the index, along with Zimbabwe and Guinea.  
 
In the ‘World Database on Happiness - 2017’ (an index of subjective wellbeing), 
Togo scored 3.9 points of 10 in average happiness for the revue-period (2016), a small 
improvement over the last revue-period (3.8, 2014). The UN World Happiness Report 
of 2017 ranked Togo as one of the lowest countries worldwide (rank 150 of 155 
surveyed countries), nevertheless it was an improvement of change in happiness in the 
most recent survey period (2014 - 2016) compared with the last period (2005-2007) by 
five points. Yet, the still very low scores were an indicator of the depressed state of the 
general feeling of the population in view of its vain attempts to effect a change of power 
over decades.  
 
 
Foreign Affairs  
 
At the 51
th
 ordinary ECOWAS summit, held early June in Liberia for the first time since 
30 years, the Togolese head of state was elected the new chairperson (4 June) for one 
year. He replaced Liberia’s President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, who had been the first 
female ECOWAS leader. The decision was hailed among others by Israel’s Prime 
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who was one of the speakers to the summit. This was the 
first visit of an Israeli prime minister to Sub-Saharan Africa in 30 years. The renewed 
Israeli interest was last, but not least, due to its desire to secure Africa’s diplomatic 
backing on Israel-related issues in international forums such as the UN. In addition, 
Israel offered cooperation in questions of counterterrorism and economic development. 
Among others, it signed a four-year US$1bn treaty to develop green energy projects 
across the (ECOWAS). During the ECOWAS summit Netanyahu urged West African 
leaders to vote for an African-Israel summit in October to be held in Lomé in order to 
intensify cooperation. This summit, the first ever, was meant to consolidate the 
rapprochement between Israel and a number of African states which had been made a 
diplomatic priority of the Israeli government. Togo had long standing friendly ties with 
Tel Aviv, notably concerning close cooperation with Israel’s security services (Mossad) 
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that had provided sophisticated advice, hard- and software already since the reign of late 
General Eyadéma. The latest remarkable provision had been in 2013, when Israel 
delivered listening and security material to the tune of more than 144 m €, i.e. about the 
double of the budget of Togolese’s army. Togo counted also to the few developing 
countries that voted along with the USA against the UN resolution condemning 
President Trump’s decision to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel at the end of 
the year. However, there was a controversy about the expediency of the Israel-Africa 
summit. It was questioned not only by the Togolese opposition in view of the actual 
political domestic crisis, but also because of reservations of Maghreb Africa, South 
Africa and Arab states concerning Israel’s position on the Palestine question. Some 
Islamic African countries like Gabun, Niger, Mali, Mauritania looked on the official 
intrusion of Israel into Africa as a provocation and called for a boycott of the summit. 
Still in September, Senegal condemned Israel’s creeping colonisation of Palestine 
territory. Member states of the OCI (Organisation de la Conference Islamique), to which 
Togo belonged already since 1997, furiously demanded reprisals against Togo. The king 
of Marco, Mohammed VI had already boycotted the ECOWAS summit in Monrovia 
because of the presence of the Israeli Prime Minister. Faure Gnassingbé, who had 
visited Jerusalem in September succeeded nevertheless to convince most his pairs to 
held the Africa-Israel summit. The conference took place in Lomé from 24. to 26. 
October, with about 30 of 55 African states represented, among them Rwanda, Kenya, 
Uganda, Congo Brazzaville, Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire and Ghana.  
 
 In view of the increasing bloody violence in Togo and its possible repercussions 
on the whole sub-region, West African leaders broke finally their silence on Togo’s 
domestic politics. On 25 October, the ECOWAS head of states, who were following a 
meeting in Niger, stressed the need for negotiations and condemned violent actions by 
the Togolese police against opponents of the regime while calling for sanctions for any 
perpetrator of violent actions. On the 52
nd
 ECOWAS-summit in Abuja (Nigeria) in mid 
of December, which was dedicated among others to discuss the security crisis in 
Guinea-Bissau and the political crisis in Togo, the members elected its new President of 
the Commissions (as distinct from the Chairman). The present Ivorian minister of mines 
Jean-Claude Brou replaced Marcel De Souza from Benin who was married to one of the 
sisters of Faure Gnassingbé, Naka Gnassingbé.  
 
Yet, most attempts to mediate in the Togolese crisis failed because the mediators 
proposed by ECOWAS apparently were not neutral. The first effort by the UN special 
representative for West Africa, the Ghanaian Mohamed Ibn Chambas, was refused by 
the opposition because the latter was apparently close to the Gnassingbé family. During 
his tenure as general secretary of ECOWAS (2002-2009) Chambas was suspected to 
have been one of the architects of the bloody and undemocratic enthronization of Faure 
Gnassingbé as Togolese head of state and heir of his father Eyadéma in 2005. The 
Togolese opposition therefore filed an action against Ibn Chambas at the UN Ethics 
Office on 29 September. A similar mistrust applied against another mediator, the 
minister of foreign affairs of Niger, Mme. Aïchatou Mindaoudou, who was meant to 
lead a mediation mission of the OIF in Lomé from 10 to 13 October which however was 
postponed sine die. A third mediation effort of the president of the AU, the Guinean 
President Alpha Condé mid of October in Lomé was postponed as well in view of the 
bloody repression of anti-government demonstrations on 18. to 19. October. End of 
October, Patrice Talon, the President of Benin, and the Ivorian President Alassane 
Ouattara tried to mediate in the Togolese crisis in vain too. The Nigeria leader 
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Muhammadu Buhari warned in November that the political instability in Togo could 
have regional consequences. Some month before, on 14 March, Buhari had signed a 
treaty with neighbouring governments to construct a highway linking the Nigerian 
commercial capital Lagos with the Ivorian capital Abidjan via Benin and Togo in order 
to facilitate international trade and exchange.  
 
 France, the former colonial power in Lomé, was concerned about the Togolese 
crisis as well. End of November, President Emmanuel Macron called for freedom of 
expression and for an electoral framework that would guarantee free and fair elections. 
In May, France, the biggest supplier of arms for Togo, had already been reluctant to 
proceed in the delivery of five French military helicopters type Gazelle to Lomé in view 
of the political crisis. At the same time, the Franco-Togolese lawyer, Pacôme 
Adjourouvi, a former classmate of Faure Gnassingbé, was nominated special councillor 
of the Togolese head of state in the rank of minister. This happened despite corruption-
accusations against Adjourouvi, investigated by the French counter-espionage DGSE 
shortly before. He was accused of having facilitated corruption as go-between to hand 
over a ‘gift’ (7.5 Mio €) of Faure Gnassingbé to the than French prime minister Manuel 
Valls during his official visit to Lomé in 2016, in order to promote the latter’s election 
campaign for the upcoming French presidentials in 2017. 
 
The annual AGOA (African Growth and Opportunity Act) forum, which had been 
initiated in 2000 to promote the trade between Africa and the USA, took place in Lomé 
from 8
th
 to 10
th
 August. The prospects of this deal were gloomy in view of the bearish 
attitude of President Trump vis à vis Africa and decreasing American imports from 
Africa in recent years (from 26.8 bn US § in 2014 to 18.7 bn US $ in 2025, i.e. – 30%), 
mainly due to decreased African oil exports.  
 
In contrast, the EU approved disbursements of 16.5 bn US $ in budgetary aid for 
Lomé in February, which was complemented by a generous German aid package of 60 
m US $ (equally divided between technical and financial cooperation), signed during a 
five day visit (8 to 13 June) of the Togolese head of state to Berlin. This aid package 
corresponded to a 50% increase in aid since the last government negotiations in 2014. 
On 22 June, the EU, France and Germany agreed in Lomé to harmonise their aid to 
Togo which amounted to about 715 m € in total for the period 2014 to 2020. Therewith, 
Europe remained the most important partner of development cooperation with Togo.  
 
China, another influential partner, provided for the construction of a modern TV-
complex for the state-run Togolese television (TVT) and Radio Lomé. The controversial 
construction of the joint Benin-Togolese Adjarala hydropower dam on the Mono river 
at the joint border, contracted by the Chinese company Sinohydro and financed with 
credits of the China Exim-bank by an amount of 551.08 m US $, which had been stalled 
in 2016 because of financial problems, apparently continued. It was meant to 
significantly increasing electricity generation by 147 megawatts. However, 
environmental, economic and social impacts on the local population were a concern. 
Approximately 21,000 people will be affected on both sides of the border, including 
12,000 people or 1,800 households in Togo. End of the year (22.12.), the AfDB 
provided about converted 11.4 m € under the Agribusiness Promotion Support Program 
(PAGAP) meant a. o. to improve conditions for inclusive growth, the development of 
agribusiness, the reduction of the agricultural trade deficit form F CFA 64 bn to 30 bn, 
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and the improvement of the tax burden ratio from 16.7% (2016) to 21% of GDP in 
2018. 
 
Since the beginning of the year the CFA franc debate attract again the attention of 
activists. A social movement developed to demand the joint withdrawal of African 
nations from the CFA franc. On 7 January, an NGO (‘SOS Pan-Africa’, ‘Urgences 
Panafricanistes’) organized anti-CFA demonstrations in several African and European 
cities. Alongside radical economists and intellectuals, the critics of the CFA franc 
included also Togo’s Kako Nubukpo, economist and former minister for the evaluation 
of public politics in the cabinet of Faure Ganssingbé, ex-BCEAO banker, and since 
2016 director of the economic and digital Francophonie. He was an outspoken critic of 
the F CFA. Critics considered the CFA franc and its peg to the Euro as a neo-colonial 
device that continued to destroy any prospect of self-reliant economic development. 
According to the critics, the CFA franc served mainly the interest of a small elite of the 
so-called Monsieurs Afrique, both in francophone Africa and France. The peg 
encouraged, last but not least, massive capital outflows. The argument was supported 
also by the gradual strengthening of the Euro against the US$ since April which 
favoured imports to the detriment of the Togolese export market. The volatility of the 
US$ vis à vis the Euro had been the main reason for the 1994 CFA franc devaluation 
that had caused widespread social and political upheaval in WAEMU member states. In 
December, Nubukpo was dismissed of the OIF because of his critical remarks on the F 
CFA as well as on the French President M. Macron and the latter’s alleged 
dishonourable remarks for African leaders.  
 
Togo continued to participate in peacekeeping missions in the sub-region, with 
about 1,400 soldiers and policemen, especially in Mali. On 1 April, the Togolese Gilbert 
F. Houngbo became the sixth President of the International Fund for Agricultural 
Development (IFAD). He previously served as Deputy Director-General of the 
International Labour Organization (ILO), and from 2008 to 2012, as Prime Minister of 
Togo.  
 
 
Socioeconomic Developments  
 
At the beginning of the year Lomé signed two new credit deals with the IMF (18. 
January, 238 m US$ for 10 years) and the World Bank (WB; 31. January; 350 m US$ 
for 3 years, 2017 to 2020). Both agreements were orientated by the National 
Development Plan (NDP) for 2018 to 2022 which was still not released at the end of the 
year officially. The NDP will replace the national Stratégie de croissance accélérée et de 
promotion de l'emploi (SCAPE, 2013-2017) and follow the same objectives. The latter 
were focussing on a more robust, inclusive and sustainable growth (4.8% in 2017), with 
due consideration of the low inflation pressure (estimated -1% in 2017), as well as a 
high, yet slowly decreasing poverty rate (55%, having come down from 61% in 2011, 
though it remained geographically concentrated), weak governance, leading to alarming 
dimensions of the current account deficit and debt. The latter were both well above the 
plafond authorized by WAEMO-regulations. Huge public infrastructure investments in 
the past years had contributed to a proliferation of public debt from 48.6 % of GDP in 
2011 to estimated 81.5% in 2017 as well as a high current account deficit reaching 9.8% 
of GDP (2016), largely due to investment related imports. Therefore, the IMF advised 
an austerity programme. The first IMF financed three-year Extended Credit Facility 
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(ECF) which had replaced the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility, had already 
expired long ago (in 2011). A new ECF was delayed up to January when a staff-level 
agreement with the government for a three year ECF with SDR 176 million (about USD 
238 million) or 120 percent of Togo’s quota in the IMF was negotiated.  
 
This fell in line with the policies of other aid-donors. Thus, the priority sectors of 
the World Bank (WB) were health, water, education, energy and agriculture. In 
September, the WB presented its new Country Partnership Framework (CPF) for the 
four year period July 2016 to June 2020, the first medium-term strategy since resuming 
IDA-financing in 2008. The increased poverty orientation of the new International 
Development Association´s (IDA, a WB-branch) IDA 18 replenishment, which 
provided increased support for fragile states, resulted in the doubling of IDA resources 
for Togo. The latter increased to up to 230 US$, available during 2018 to 2020, which – 
combined with the 113 US$ IDA financing approved already in 2017 and other 
resources from the sub-regional IDA envelop - amounted to a total of over 350 m US$ 
in grants and low to zero interest loans for the CPF period. The restructuring of the two 
large, but weak public banks (BTCI and UTB) that had been delayed several times, but 
envisaged a. o. by the most recent IMF’s Extended Credit Facility (ECF) arrangement, 
was still under way at the end of the year.  
 
The African Development Bank assisted the government to cope with another 
serious problem, the man-made costal erosion. In the middle of the year it approved a 
41 m US$ loan to Togo and Benin for the construction of 28 groynes in order to 
stabilise the shoreline. According to expert’s estimates the Togolese coastline receded 
by 10 meters per year on average, and even by up to 20 metres per year east to the deep 
water harbour of Lomé, constructed in 1968. Two national roads along the coast had 
already been washed away, and the former coastal colonial capital Anecho was 
threatened of submersion by 2030, which could lead to the displacement of thousands of 
people. Apart from the negative effects of the construction and extension of the port of 
Lomé with its impact on sedimentary accumulation by the produced change of sea 
currents, other human interference had accelerated coastal erosion too. Notably, the 
illegal harvesting for sand and gravel along the shore for construction purposes.  
 
The low and decreasing ranking of Togo in the annual Human Development Report, 
published in March for the past year (2016), showed however that economic growth did 
not necessarily bring about improved human development. Togo’s HDI ranking 
decreased by -52.0 units, from 114.0 (1990) to 166.0 (2015) to the bottom of 188 
countries surveyed. 
 
In addition, a WB publication on the geographical concentration of welfare, 
published in November, showed that there was an alarming variation in poverty 
between the so called leading and lagging areas of Togo. Nine out of 36 prefectures 
counted among the leading regions: Togare Bassar, Cinkassé, Danyi, Golfe, Lacs, 
Lomé, Ogou, Tchaoudjo, and Vo. Poverty in the far North of Togo was up to three 
times as high as in the South. Poverty rates observed varied between 15% in the top 
three prefectures (Golfe, Lacs, and Lomé) and more than 90% in the bottom three 
(Tandjoaré, Akebou, and Doufelgou). The largest poor population was concentrated in 
Oti prefecture, the most disadvantaged area in terms of income.  
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According to official data presented by the government end of January, the 
unemployment rate had decreased from 6.5% in 2011 to 3.4% in 2015, including 55.1% 
poor unemployed, according to the national institute of statistics (Inseed). However, 
these figures were questioned as rather politically motivated calculus in view of 
reference levels of unemployment in neighbouring countries like Ghana (12%) or 
Nigeria (13%). In addition, the rate of under-employment had increased from 22.8% 
(2011) to 24.9% (2015), making a total of 28.3% un- and under-employed mostly young 
people. The National Agency of Volunteers (Agence Nationale de Volontariat au Togo, 
ANVT) which had tried to tackle this problem in the past five years by mobilizing 
11,189 young people (out of 70,000 candidates) nevertheless succeeded to insert 2,284 
only young unemployed into the labour market. Of the economically active population 
the majority (51%) were small farmers, 39% independent non-agricultural workers and 
10% employed in the formal sector. The latter comprised 88,000 jobs, 67% in the public 
sector and 33% in the private sector. 
 
Phosphate production, the major export industry, which had been nationalized under 
late Eyadéma Gnassingbé (the father of Faure) in 1974, was boosted by the completion 
of a 1.4bn US$ project to mine 5 m tonnes per year of phosphate rock. The production 
was manged by the Société Nouvelle des Phosphates du Togo (SNPT) and 
supplemented by the construction of a phosphoric acid and fertiliser plant, built by 
Elenilto, an Israeli mining company. According to the African Investigative Publishing 
Collective (aipc, Accra), phosphate production was informally administered directly 
from the offices of President Gnassingbé by the Moroccan-Israeli family of Raphael and 
Liron Edery. Evidence suggested that this special arrangement could have facilitated 
corruption. In 2016 and 2017, for example, close to 90% of Togo’s phosphates had been 
bought well below world-market prices by ‘privileged clients’, i.e. the Indian family of 
shippers Gupta-Kalyan. Ashok Gupta had been already under investigation by the 
Australian Federal Police in another case for bribing of politicians in exchange for the 
phosphate resources.  
 
Informal trade with neighbouring countries had unintended consequences. This the 
more so, as Togo belonged to the African countries with high reliance on the informal 
sector (over 40% of GDP). Spillovers from Nigeria’s fuel price policy to Togo for 
example resulted in an unwanted subsidy of Nigerian transfers to the equivalent of at 
least 3% of Togo’s GDP in 2011, three-quarters of which was captured by petrol 
smugglers according to IMF studies published in the course of the year. Additional 
negative externalities were reported on lowering the tax base on petrol in Togo. Other 
underestimated spillovers concerned regional shocks and the impact of a slowdown in 
Nigeria which could have significant impact on Togo too. 
 
Of similar importance to aid from the international donor community was the 
contribution of Togolese migrants who were sending money home. According to the 
most recent data of the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD, a 
special UN agency to eradicate poverty) on remittances, published on 15 June, 
remittances of Togolese migrants totalled 287 m US$ in 2016, or 9.1% of GDP. 
However, this indicated a slight decrease of importance compared with 2007, when 
Togo counted among the top five countries reliant on remittances worldwide with 11% 
of GDP. Still, the remittances market served mainly the population in urban centres. It 
had a comparative limited payout presence of 44%  in rural areas. According to 
available data (2009) most inbound payments of remittances in Togo were handled by 
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post offices (38%), banks (23%) and micro finance institutions (14%) like Western 
Union and Money Express. This bottleneck could be overcome by mobile phone money 
adoption. A scholarly study, published in April, revealed that social groups, including 
religious and students organizations, were powerful vehicles for the adoption of mobile 
money in Togo. In contrast, being unemployed decreased the likelihood to adopt mobile 
money. 
Unemployment of Togo’s school leavers and dearth of prospects for the future 
continued to stimulate outward migration to Europe. However, their fate was uncertain. 
The International Organisation for Migration (IOM, Geneva) disclosed on 28. 
November that in 2016 more than 330,000 migrants had passed the frontier between 
Niger and Libya for European destination, among them at least 300 Togolese. Reports 
on gross human rights violations, trafficking in human beings and slavery in about 30 
Libyan refugees-detention camps around Tripoli, harbouring more than 20,000 captured 
migrants, highlighted the hazards linked to this kind of migration. 
Also ships under Togolese registration were reported to have carried clandestine 
migrants to Turkey and European harbours in 2015. In February, the national body 
responsible for state action at sea (ONAEM-Togo), created in 2014, revealed in its 
second annual report that of 566 vessels registered in Togo end of 2016 about 200 had 
to be radiated from the list because they had tarnished the image of the country and 
acted in illegality.  
In addition, piracy remained a problem in the Gulf of Guinea off West Africa. The 
International Maritime Bureau (IMB) recorded 92 ships boarded by pirates during the 
first three quarters of 2017, 13 vessels were fired upon, and another five hijacked. The 
vast majority of attacks (75%) took place along the Nigerian coast. But attacks included 
waters from Nigeria's neighbours, Togo, Benin and Cameroon too. Four reported 
"maritime incidents" happened "offshore" of Togo. However, not all incidents of piracy 
were reported, notably not the failed attacks.  
 
Within the realm of education a representative WB-study on primary schools in 
Africa ‘What do teachers know and do – Does it matter?’, published in January, 
revealed worrying evidence. None of the teachers in Togo met the criteria for a 
minimum knowledge in language. When it came to understanding and solving a simple 
math story problem only about 30% of Togolese primary school teachers gave a correct 
answer and merely 5% could monitor and comment on the learning progression of their 
pupils. The minimum knowledge in general pedagogy was 3%. Consequently the 
student’s knowledge stood well below the African average. Barely 16% could read a 
sentence, the overall comprehension score in literacy was 10 out of 100, and just 9% of 
pupils could solve a simple math story.  
In July, the government concluded a contract with the English enterprise Bboxx to 
provide 300,000 domestic solar-home-kits to be distributed in rural areas in the next 
five years within the framework of the CIZO (enlighten, in Mina, the local language) 
initiative at an estimated cost of about 117 m US$. Thereby, the electrification rate in 
rural areas was meant to rise from the present 6% to 35% in 2022. The government was 
to provide about 15 m US$, and 102.5 m US$ will have to be secured from private 
investors, i.e. to be sold on a pay-as-you-go model using popular mobile payment 
solutions by the sale of the kits via mobile payments (PAYGO). In the pilot stage, the 
first 10,000 kits will be delivered for the rural areas within the next year, assisted by an 
initial funding of about 1 m US$ of the Sustainable Energy Fund for Africa (SEFA), a 
multi-donor trust fund administered by the African Development Bank.  
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The new budget for 2018 was adopted in parliament as usual at the end of the year 
(20th December). With a total of 1,321.9 bn F CFA it represented an 7.7% increase over 
the 2017 budget. 44% of the budget was consecrated to expenditures for health, 
education and to grass-root socio-economic development. The deputies of the 
opposition boycotted the vote en bloc in view of the political crisis. Notably they 
scathed the opacity of budget management and the violation of the financial law 
(LOLF), stipulating the justification of the foregoing budget before voting on the new 
budget. However, the National Assembly had not justified till then the budget of 2016, 
2015 and 2014, apparently because the audit court had reported inconsistencies 
concerning the execution the 2014 budget which had not be cleared up to date. In 
addition, the opposition complained about impunity vis à vis tax fraud, mismanagement 
of parastatals like Togo Telecom, SNPT, the autonomous port of Lomé and the two 
state-owned banks, etc. 
 
Aggregated indicators of Togo’s economic freedom showed stagnation or even 
regression. The World Bank Doing Business Report 2018 on business regulation and 
the protection of property rights for 190 countries worldwide, published on 9. 
November, reported a slight deterioration for Togo from rank 154 (2017) to 156 (2018), 
both well below its peers in the WAEMU region and the Sub-Saharan average. Togo’s 
political and administrative operating environment constituted a barrier to the growth of 
private direct investment and private sector activities. A thorough reform was prevented 
by vested interests, lacking administrative and judicial transparency and widespread 
corruption. Economic freedom, as measured by the Heritage Foundation’s Economic 
Freedom Index 2018, published in November 2017, decreased as well from rank 137 
(2016) to 144 (score: 67.2) of 183 countries surveyed. In short, Togo’s economic 
freedom too remained with the overall status of ‘mostly unfree’. 
 
